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CLAUSE OF FIRST AMENDMENT-Resnick

Since 1962 the East Brunswick Township Board of Education
(Board) has maintained a policy of allowing local groups to utilize the
township's public school facilities during nonschool hours. 1 Organizations which have availed themselves of this program include religious
as well as other nonprofit groups. 2 In return for their use of the
buildings, such organizations must pay a rental fee which approximates the cost of any extra janitorial services required to maintain the
1 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 259, 343 A.2d 127,
128 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J.
88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 93, 389
A.2d 944, 946 (1978). The rental policy was mandated by the Board of Education's Rules and
Regulations Governing Use of East Brunswick School Facilities, which, as quoted by the New
Jersey supreme court, states in pertinent part:
1. Statement of Philosophy
It is the feeling of this Board of Education that each of the East Brunswick Public
Schools, build [sic] and maintained through the expenditure of public funds, should
be utilized to the fullest extent possible by East Brunswick community groups and
agencies.
77 N.J. at 93, 389 A.2d at 946 (quoting Rules & Regulations § III (C)(1)).
Although the Board's "Rules and Regulations Governing Use of East Brunswick School
Facilities" were amended in 1969 and 1976, there was no substantive change in the passage
quoted by the court. See Rules & Regulations, supra, § III (C)(1).
This type of board policy was arguably authorized by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20-34 (West
1968), which provides in part:
The board of education of any district may, pursuant to rules adopted by it, permit
the use of any schoolhouse and rooms therein, and the grounds and other property
of the district, when not in use for school purposes, for any of the following purposes:
a. The assembly of persons for the purpose of giving and receiving
instruction in any branch of education, learning, or the arts, including the
science of agriculture, horticulture, and floriculture;

c. The holding of such social, civic, and recreational meetings and
entertainments and such other purposes as may be approved by the
board.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20-34 (a), (c) (West 1968).
2 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 259, 343 A.2d 127,
128 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), revd, 77 N.J.
88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 93, 389
A.2d 944, 946 (1978). The various groups which have used the school buildings include girl
scout and boy scout troops, a language school, drama clubs and a square dancing association.
See Brief and Appendix for Defendant-Appellant East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ. at 3,
Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Defendant-Appellant East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ.].
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buildings. 3 Rental applications are made to the principal of the particular school involved. 4 Groups which use the school buildings on a
"steady basis," 5 such as the various religious groups, make annual
reapplications. 6
Plaintiff, Abraham Resnick, had been a resident of East
Brunswick for more than eighteen years. 7 He had been aware of the
board's rental policy for an extended period of time.8 Resnick
petitioned the board of education to cease renting the school facilities
to the various religious groups. 9 In view of the Board's inaction concerning this petition, Resnick, in October, 1974, sought to enjoin the
continuation of the rental practice. 10 The complaint was predicated

3 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 259, 343 A.2d 127,
128 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J.
88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 94, 389
A.2d 944, 947 (1978). The rental fee assessed was $4.50 per hour while the actual out-of-pocket
cost to the Board for janitorial services was $6.75 per hour, Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp.
Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 94 & n.1, 389 A.2d 944, 947 (1978). The disparity of $2.25 per hour
between the fee charged and the actual out-of-pocket costs is comprised of the Board's administrative, heat and utility expenses which were not billed to the various groups using the facilities.
Id.; see Brief of Defendant-Appellant Reform Temple of East Brunswick at 5, Resnick v. East
Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77
N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978). Groups using the school facilities to house fund raising events,
excluding religious service collections, would be charged a substantially higher rental rate. 77
N.J. at 94 & n.2, 389 A.2d at 947.
4 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 343 A.2d 127 (Ch.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389
A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 94, 389 A.2d 944,
947 (1978).
5 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 343 A.2d 127 (Ch.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389
A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 94, 389 A.2d 944,
947 (1978). "Steady basis" groups are those organizations which use the school facilities for an
"indeterminate period." 77 N.J. at 94, 389 A.2d at 947.
6 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 343 A.2d 127 (Ch.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389
A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 94, 389 A.2d 944,
947 (1978). While these groups must make annual reapplications, filing is merely a formality and
the groups effectively have an open ended lease for an "indeterminate period." 77 N.J. at 94,
389 A.2d at 947; see notes 104-05 & 109-13 infra and accompanying text.
I See Brief and Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant Resnick at 2, Resnick v. East Brunswick
Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for PlaintiffAppellant Resnick].
8 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Resnick, supra note 7, at 2.
' Resnick v. East Brunswick Tw.p. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 343 A.2d 127 (Ch.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389
A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 96, 389 A.2d 944,
948 (1978).
10 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 259, 343 A.2d 127,
128 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J.
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upon the allegation that the use of the public schools by the religious
organizations was statutorily unauthorized " and violative of both the
13
state 12 and federal constitutions.
The trial court held that the use of public schools for religious
education and instruction was permissible under state statutory law,
while the conducting of religious worship services within the same
buildings was forbidden. 14 The court further ruled that the rental
program, as implemented, was violative of the New Jersey Constitution.15 Finally, the act of renting public school facilities to religious
groups was found to violate the first and fourteenth amendments of

88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 96, 389
A.2d 944, 948 (1978).
11 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 259, 343 A.2d 127,
128 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J.
88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 96, 389
A.2d 944, 948 (1978). The question concerning the legality of the use of public school facilities
by religious organizations arose under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20--34 (West 1968). See note 1
supra.
12 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 259, 343 A.2d 127,
128 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J.
88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978). Resnick argued that the Board's rental policy violated article I of the
New Jersey Constitution which states in pertinent part:
Nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or
repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or has
deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform.
135 N:J. Super. at 263, 343 A.2d at 128 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 3).
Additionally, Resnick contended that the program should be declared invalid for violating
the New Jersey Constitution, which mandates that "[tihere shall be no establishment of one
religious sect in preference to another." N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 4; 135 N.J. Super. at 263, 343
A.2d at 128.
'a Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 259, 343 A.2d 127,
128 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J.
88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978).
Resnick asserted that the rental program was violative of the first amendment of the United
States Constitution which is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 135
N.J. Super. at 259, 343 A.2d at 128. The first amendment, in pertinent part, dictates that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14 See Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 262, 343 A.2d
127, 129-30 (Cb. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J.
88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978).
11 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. 257, 265, 343 A.2d 127, 131 (Ch.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944
(1978). The court, in qualifying this aspect of its holding, stated that while the program in its
present state violated article I, paragraph 3 of New Jersey's constitution, an increase in the
rental fee to recover the extra costs incurred by the Board in providing facilities for religious
education and instruction would remove the constitutional infirmity. 135 N.J. at 265, 343 A.2d
at 131; see notes 3 supra & 89-90 infra and accompanying text.
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the United States Constitution. 16 The appellate division, in a per
curiam decision, 17 affirmed the chancery division judgment "substantially for the [same] reasons expressed in the opinion of the trial
court." 18

The defendants- appealed as of right. 19 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey, in Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Education,2 0 reversed the appellate court decision. 2 ' In so holding, New
Jersey's highest court reasoned that title 18A, section 20-34 of the
New Jersey Statutes Annotated authorized the use of public facilities
for religious worship as well as religious instruction during nonschool
hours. 2 2 In addition, so long as the religious groups reimbursed the
16 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. 257, 268, 343 A.2d 127, 133 (Ch.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944
(1978).
17 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 144 N.J. Super. 474, 475, 366 A.2d 345,
345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978).
18 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 144 N.J. Super. 474, 475, 366 A.2d 345,
345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978).
19 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 343 A.2d 127 (Ch.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389
A.2d 944 (1978); Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 98, 389 A.2d 944,
949 (1978).
The original defendant named in the complaint was the Board of Education. The East
Brunswick Baptist Church, the Nativity Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Reform Temple
of East Brunswick were allowed to intervene as defendants. 77 N.J. 88, 96, 389 A.2d 944, 948
(1978).
In 1968, the Nativity Evangelical Lutheran Church began renting space in the Warnsdorfer
Elementary School. East Brunswick Baptist Church had used the Robert Frost Elementary
School since 1969. The Reform Temple of East Brunswick first rented the facilities at the Irwin
Elementary School in 1973. Id. at 94-95, 389 A.2d at 947; see Brief for Defendant-Appellant
East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra note 2, at 2-3.
Of the four original defendants, only the Reform Temple and the Board of Education
elected to appeal the appellate division decision. 77 N.J. at 98, 389 A.2d at 947. In addition to
these two defendants, the court permitted the New Jersey Council of Churches "to intervene as
a party defendant." Id. at 98, 389 A.2d at 949.
20 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978).
21 Id. at 121, 389 A.2d at 960.
22 Id. at 98-99, 102, 389 A.2d at 949-50 (1978); see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20-34 (West
1968). In arguing that the Board's policy was invalid, plaintiff-appellant Resnick stated that the
use of public facilities was not contemplated within the meaning of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:2034 (West 1968). 77 N.J. at 96, 389 A.2d at 948. This contention was based upon an interpretation of the statute arrived at through the use of the statutory construction doctrines ejusdem
generis and expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See id. at 99-102, 389 A.2d at 949-50.
With respect to the expressio unius rule, Resnick stated that the statute had enumerated
specific uses of school facilities which a board of education could permit, and since religious
instruction and worship were not included therein, they are, by implication, excluded as valid
uses of public school facilities. See id. at 99, 389 A.2d at 949.
Resnick also argued that the ejusdem generis doctrine should be applied by the court to
interpret the statute. Id. at 100, 389 A.2d at 950. Under this construction doctrine, general
words which follow a specific listing within a statute would only be applicable to the class of
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out-of-pocket costs to the school board, the program would not violate
the state constitution. 23 Lastly, the court found that the rental program was not violative of the first and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution, concluding that "[t]he East Brunswick
scheme entails none of the dangers of the establishment of religion by
government which the Constitution seeks to prevent." 24 Justice Clifford dissented, stating that the Board's policy of renting to religious
groups for worship services was invalid under section 20-3425 as well
26
as violative of the first and fourteenth amendments.
The establishment clause of the first amendment 2 7 was initially
found to have been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, and
things delineated by the specific language. Id.; see J. SUTHERLAND,

STATUTORY CONSTRUC-

TION § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973).
The court found the use of the buildings by township religious groups to be within the
purview of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20-34 (West 1968). See 77 N.J. at 101-02, 389 A.2d at 950.
In answering the statutory construction arguments proffered by Resnick, the court stated that
any use of the construction doctrines was to aid in the interpretation of the statutes and not
control it. Id. at 99, 389 A.2d at 949. See also Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 539, 166 A.2d 360,
365 (1960); J. SUTHERLAND, supra at § 47.17. Furthermore, the court declared that the intention of the legislature was to be the ultimate guideline when construing a statute. 77 N.J. at 99,
389 A.2d at 949. See also Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. at 539, 166 A.2d at 360, 365. Finally, the
court warned that the construction aids must "be applied with great caution, and not arbitrarily
or in a manner at variance with its true purpose." 77 N.J. at 99, 389 A.2d at 949.
In upholding the validity of the Board's policy, the court found the expressio unius doctrine
to be inapplicable. The court focused upon the wording of title 18A, section 20-34(c), which
allows the Board to permit "[t]he holding of such . . . meetings and . . . such other purposes as

may be approved by the board." 77 N.J. at 99, 389 A.2d at 949. Because of this language, the
court held that it was the intention of the legislature to give local school boards "wide discretion" in the usage of their school facilities. Id.
The court also found that use of school buildings by religious groups was valid under an
application of the ejusdem generis doctrine. Id. at 100-01, 389 A.2d at 950. The nature of the
religious group activities was held to be within the boundaries of the "common denominators"
of the listed activities such as "group interaction, emotional release, regular participation of a
portion of the community and character building." Id. at 101, 389 A.2d at 950.
Historical precedent was the final factor which helped the court to construe the statute in
favor of permitting religious groups to use public school buildings. Id. Noting the frequency
with which religious groups used public school facilities at the time section 18A:20-30 was
enacted, the court postulated that "the absence of an express declaration to the contrary is
strong evidence that the legislature did not intend to prohibit this long-standing practice." Id.
See also W. CLAYTON, HISTORY OF UNION AND MIDDLESEX COUNTIES, NEW JERSEY 771-74
(1882).
23 77 N.J. at 103, 389 A.2d at 951. The court held that a rental program providing for full
reimbursement of the Board's out-of-pocket costs would not violate article I, paragraph 3 of the
New Jersey Constitution, which prohibits the use of tax revenues for the benefit of any church
or religion. Id.
24 77 N.J. at 120, 389 A.2d at 960. The court's constitutional analysis was limited to the
establishment clause of the first amendment. Id.
25 Id. at 121, 389 A.2d at 960.
26 Id.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. 1; see note 10 supra.
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hence made applicable to the states, by the United States Supreme
Court in Everson v. Board of Education.28 In Everson, the Township of Ewing, New Jersey, instituted a program, authorized by a
state statute, whereby the parents of children forced to take public
transportation to school were partially reimbursed for the cost of that
transportation. 2 9 Included in the group of parents eligible for reimbursement were parents of children who attended nonpublic religious
30
schools.
28 330 U.S. 1, 15, rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947). Everson was the first case in
which the Court dealt exclusively with the establishment clause. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 702 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963); see
Kauper, Everson v. Board of Education: A Product of the Judicial Will, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 307,
307, 311 (1973). However, the constrictions of the religious clauses of the first amendment had
previously been held to be applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 108 (1943). The Court in Cantwell stated that "[tihe First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent
as Congress to enact such laws." 310 U.S. at 303. The ultimate question in Cantwell in this
respect arose under the free exercise and due process clauses, id. at 300-01, but this did not
prevent the Everson Court from recognizing that the principles of both religion clauses had
been extended to apply to the states. 330 U.S. at 8, 15.
Prior to Everson, a number of state courts had decided cases which involved relationships
between various religious groups and local governments. For example, in State v. Dilley, 95
Neb. 527, 145 N.W. 999 (1914), the Nebraska supreme court held that the use of school buildings by religious groups on Sundays was permissible under the Nebraska Constitution. Id. at
529-30, 145 N.W. at 999-1000. In allowing the use, the court specifically found that there was
no interference with any school business and that Sunday services by the religious groups had
not converted the school buildings into places of worship. Id. at 529, 145 N.W. at 999. But in
Spencer v. Joint School-Dist. No. 6, 15 Kan. 202 (1875), a taxpayer sought to enjoin the school
district from leasing its school buildings for other than school purposes. Id. at 203. The court
determined that the issuance of an injunction disallowing any use of public schools for any
private purpose was appropriate. Id. at 204. See also School Directors v. Toll, 149 I11.App. 541
(1909); Eckhardt v. Darby, 118 Mich. 199, 76 N.W. 761 (1898); Scofield v. Eighth School Dist.,
27 Conn. 499 (1858). One commentator has pointed out that these state court decisions were
based, for the most part, upon construction of local statutes and rarely involved constitutional
interpretation of the permissibility of the uses involved. See C. ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CIVIL
CHURCH LAw 33-35 (1969). However, when the inquiry did rise to the constitutional level, the
courts reviewed the statute under constraints placed on it by the constitution of that particular
state and not the federal constitution. Id. For a general discussion of the pre-Everson church and
state concept, see generally Note, Nineteenth Century Judicial Thought Concerning ChurchState Relations, 40 MINN. L. REV. 672 (1956).
29 330 U.S. at 3 & n.I. The statute involved in Everson was N.J. REV. STAT. § 18:14-8

(Cum. Supp. 1941) which stated in pertinent part:
Whenever in any district there are children living remote from any schoolhouse,
the board of education of the district may make rules and contracts for the transportation of such children to and from school, including the transportation of school
children to and from school other than a public school, except such school as is
operated for profit in whole or in part.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 18:14-8 (Cui. Supp. 1941); 330 U.S. at 3 n.1.
30 330 U.S. at 3.
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The Court, speaking through Justice Black, found the reimbursement plan to be a valid governmental exercise pursuant to the
standards set by the establishment clause. 3 1 The Court observed
that the first amendment requires a distinction to be made between
constitutionally permissible legislation which authorizes a program for
the welfare of the general public, of which religious institutions are
members, and legislation designed solely to support or fund those
31 Id. at 18. In arriving at its decision, the Court felt it was necessary to review the historical significance and purpose of the religion clauses of the first amendment. Id. at 8-14; id. at
33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). For the purpose of this Note, and because of the extensive
documentation of the background and adoption of the first amendment, a brief historical account
of the birth of the religion clauses will suffice.
The adoption of the first amendment was the end product of the religious persecution
which was rampant in early colonial America. See 330 U.S. at 8-10. The colonial charters granted
by the English Crown preconditioned the right to form a settlement upon the erection of a
governmentally established religion. Id. at 9-10. Settlers in these areas were forced to pay taxes in
support of the church, without regard to their belief or nonbelief. Id. at 9.
Even after the United States had won its freedom from England, state-supported religion
flourished in the various states. Id. at 11. However, the sentiment of the people in many of
these areas began to turn against the idea of governmental support of religion. Id. at 11. The
fear of the dominance and persecution which accompanies a state religion grew in the minds of
the colonials. Id. at 9-11. The public outcry for religious liberty was nowhere greater than in Virginia. Id. at 11; id. at 33-34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). In 1785-1786 the Viriginia legislature
voted to renew its taxing policy in support of the Anglican Church. Id. at 11; id. at 36 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). Thomas Jefferson and James Madison spearheaded the fight against the tax. Id. at
11-12; id. at 33-36 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Prior to the legislative vote on the merits.of the tax,
Madison issued his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. J.
Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted in I J.
MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 162 (1865) [hereinafter cited as

Memorial & Remonstrance]. See also 330 U.S. at 63-72 app. (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Therein,
Madison particularized the specific evils which accompany a state supported religion. Memorial
& Remonstrance, supra, at 162-69. On the strength of the protest aroused by A Memorial and
Remonstrance, the tax assessment bill died in December, 1785. 330 U.S. at 12; id. at 38 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Shortly thereafter, Madison's influence was again felt when the Virginia
legislature enacted Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. Id. at 38 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Riding the wake of his religious liberty victory in Virginia, Madison was sent to the first
Congress. Id. at 38 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Convinced that the national government should
have no right to support or involve itself with religion, Madison pledged to fight for a bill of
rights guaranteeing, inter alia, religious liberty to all Americans. Id. at 38-39 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). Some three years later, Madison's convictions and efforts produced the religion
clauses of the first amendment. Id. at 39 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). For a more comprehensive
depiction of the adoption of the first amendment, see generally S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIoIous LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902).
While both the majority and dissenters felt it necessary to resolve the question in Everson

with at least one eye upon the historical influences of the establishment clause, many commentators have stressed the necessity to revise the interpretation of the religion clauses and their
values and not rely upon the eighteenth century values of Jefferson and Madison. See Giannella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, The Religious Liberty
Guarantee (Pt. 1), 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1381-84 (1967) & The Nonestablishment Principle
(Pt. II), 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 513-15 (1968); Kauper, supra note 29, at 317-22.
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32
institutions which teach or profess the tenets of a certain religion.
With respect to general welfare programs, the Court determined that
a governing body could not exclude members of a religious group
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation merely on the
33
basis of their faith.
The standard used by the Court in Everson was one of governmental neutrality towards religious institutions. 34 In what was to
be the bedrock for later neutrality analyses, Justice Black articulated
this standard as requiring that a government neither be hostile nor
overly supportive of religion. 35 Justice Black further defined the
32 330 U.S. at 14. The divisional line between the permissible inclusion of religious groups
in a general welfare program and an impermissible aiding of religion was the keystone of the
majority's decision in Everson. See id. at 16-18. This idea of permitting religious institutions to
receive the benefits of social welfare legislation has played a preeminent role in Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (Court found federal legislation calling for construction aid grants to schools of higher education not to be per se violation
of establishment clause merely because some of these schools had religious ties); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (tax exemption granted to all charitable organizations held
valid despite fact that religious groups were included in statutory definition of charitable organization); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (Court upheld program of loaning
textbooks to students in grades seven through twelve of any school, notwithstanding fact that
parochial schools would receive incidental benefit of not having to purchase those books).
3 330 U.S. at 16-18. For Justice Black, the indirect benefits received by a parochial school
as a by-product of New Jersey's bus fare reimbursement plan were no different than the police
and fire protection benefits which it received by being a member of society. Id. at 17-18. In his
dissent, Justice Rutledge distinguishes the majority's public welfare benefit argument by stating
that neither the public nor the individual's welfare "is furthered when the state promotes religious education." Id. at 52 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). He argued further that police and fire
protection were "matters of common right, part of the general need for safety," a category of
"'public function[s]"' which does not encompass religious education. Id. at 6061 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
31 330 U.S. at 15. This neutrality principle was interpreted by the commentators at the time
of Everson to mean that aid to religious groups which was indirect and incidental to public
purpose legislation would not violate the demands of the establishment clause. See, e.g., 60
HARV. L. REV. 793, 795-97 (1947). But see 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 331, 332-33 (1947). These
interpretations seem correct, in retrospect, for Justice Black in his opinions. following Everson
draws the line between state benefits received by a religious institution which are indirect and
incidental, deemed permissible, and those which are direct and primary and therefore deemed
impermissible. In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), Justice Black dissented from
the majority's ruling that a New York statute which authorized a loan program of textbooks to
students in grades seven through twelve was constitutionally valid. Id. at 250 (Black, J., dissenting). Distinguishing his Everson opinion, Justice Black argued that the textbook was the most
essential educational tool and therefore the aid differed from the bus fare reimbursements involved in Everson with respect to its direct effect upon religion. Id. at 252-53 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (Justice
Black reprimanded majority for abandoning governmental neutrality requirement outlined in
Everson and thereby validating program which "'encourages religious instruction"').
35 330 U.S. at 15. In arriving at this neutrality standard the Everson Court stated that
[the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
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principle by declaring that while the first amendment demanded governmental neutrality in dealings with both believers and nonbeliev36
ers, it in no way required the state to be hostile toward either.
Therefore, in upholding the New Jersey School Transportation
Statute, the Court viewed any benefit which might be received by a
religious school as being an incidental benefit, 3 7 derived by the
school as a result of its association with the recipients of the direct
38
benefits of the legislation.
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another
.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions.
id.
In light of the ultimate holding by the Court, Justice Black's neutrality test has been
criticized as being merely dictum. See Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment
Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 107, 114 & n.29 (1974). Professor Kauper
stated that "since the Court in Eversoh upheld the state program under consideration ...
Justice [Black's] statement is technically dictum. Nonetheless it retains vitality as a clear articulation of the no-aid-to-religion view." Id. at 114 n.29. The authoritativeness of Justice Black's
statement was also questioned by Justice Jackson in his dissent in Everson when he stated that
"the undertones of the [majority] opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising
separation
of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their
commingling in educational matters." 330 U.S. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
36 330 U.S. at 18. This language, which begins the formulation of the neutrality test, was
later interpreted to embrace the accommodation of religion standard used in subsequent cases.
See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
315 (1952).
37 330 U.S. at 17-18. The Court recognized that the schools received a benefit from the
statute in that the parents of the school children were aided in affording the cost of transporting
those children to the nonpublic schools. Id.
38 Id. The parents were the direct recipients of the benefits issuing from the legislation. Id.
The fact that the legislation called for no aid to be given to the religious school directly was the
factor which ultimately allowed the Court to find that any benefit which the schools received
was only incidental. Id. The dissenters did not find the majority's incidental benefit argument
persuasive. Justice Jackson took cognizance of the purposes of the private schools in questionto promote and indoctrinate the Catholic religion. Id. at 22-23 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Taking
this into consideration, he argued that the issue is not whether the church schools are the
primary or incidental beneficiaries of the program. Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The state
may not, in Justice Jackson's view, sustain a church at all, either directly or indirectly. Id. at
24-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Likewise, Justice Rutledge saw no difference between direct aid and indirect aid to a
church under the establishment clause standards. Id. at 57 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Referring
to the Everson bus fare plan, he stated that "distant as it may be in its present form from a
complete establishment of religion, it differs from it only in degree; and is the first step in that
direction." Id. Finally, Justice Rutledge observed that first amendment encroachments are matters of principle not of quantity or degree and that the standard which the Court should follow
is "to keep separate the separate spheres as the First Amendment drew them" apart. Id. at 63
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). The shortcoming inherent within the policies advocated by Justices
Jackson and Rutledge, as pointed out by various commentators, is that through complete separation, a government would be forced into a policy of hostility towards religion or the fostering of
nonreligion over religion. See, e.g., Giannella, supra note 31, 81 HARV. L. REV. at 513-28;
Kauper, supra note 28, at 319-22.
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The principle of neutrality remained as a vague guideline for case
analysis under the establishment clause for the sixteen years following
Everson. 3 9 The Court finally refined the establishment clause
analysis in School District v. Schempp.4 0 In Schempp, Pennsylvania
39 In response to the Everson decision numerous commentators expressed their fear that the
Supreme Court had not established sufficient guidelines for future courts to use in analyzing
establishment of religion cases. See, e.g., 60 HARV. L. REV., supra note 35, at 799-800; 22
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV., supra note 35, at 332-33.
40 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Prior to the Schempp decision the Court decided three cases which
dealt with issues arising under the establishment clause. In McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948), the Court was presented with a release-time program within the public schools
which allowed children an opportunity to receive religious instruction. Id. at 205. The program
involved the local school board granting permission for various religious groups to teach the
tenets of their religions for thirty to forty-five minutes weekly. Id. at 207-08. Only those students whose parents requested that the student receive the instruction were allowed to do so.
Id. at 207. Students not attending the religious classes had to move to another part of the school
building and pursue their secular studies. Id. at 209.
The majority of the Court found the program to be an impermissible cooperation between
church and state. Id. at 212. The Court declared that the "close cooperation between the school
authorities and the religious council" resulted in the promotion of religion. Id. at 209. Also, the
operation of the state's compulsory education system was found to "assist" as well as being
"integrated with the program of religious instruction." Id. Lastly, in striking down the program
as being violative of the establishment clause, the Court stated that it was not a manifestation of
government hostility toward religion to hold that a public school system could not be used to
spread religious faiths because religion and government can work best when "each is left free
from the other within its respective sphere." Id. at 211-12.
As the lone dissenter, Justice Reed argued that the historical precedent of religious tolerance of the past weighed heavily for approval of the release-time program. Id. at 239-41 (Reed,
J., dissenting). The practices of past cooperation between schools and religion were, in Justice
Reed's view, against the majority's interpretation of the first amendment. Id. at 241, 255 (Reed,
J., dissenting). In support of the program, he reasoned that "[tihis is an instance where ...the
history of past practices is determinative of the meaning of a constitutional clause, not a decorous introduction to the study of its text." Id. at 256 (Reed, J., dissenting).
In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court was again faced with a release-time
statute. Id. at 308; see N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3210(1)(b) (McKinney 1970). The New York City
program in question differed from the program involved in McCollum in that the students who
requested inclusion in the religious instruction program were allowed to leave the public school
building to attend the religious session. Compare McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. at 205
with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 308. Those not involved in the program remained in their
classroom during this time. Id.
In finding the statute not violative of the first amendment, the Court distinguished Zorach
and McCollum, holding that the pivotal difference between the cases was the use of the school
buildings by the religious groups which was present in McCollum but absent in Zorach. Id. at
309. In the Court's opinion, the Zorach program was merely an accommodation of religion by
the public school system. Id. at 315. In arriving at its conclusion, the Zorach Court placed some
of its emphasis upon the religious nature of the country when, through Mr. Justice Douglas, it
stated that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being ....
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities .. . it
follows the best of our traditions." Id. at 313-14; see McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. at
239-41 (Reed, J., dissenting). In light of Zorach, it has been argued that the Court's McCollum
decision was misguided. See, e.g., Giannella, supra note 31, 81 HARv. L. REV. at 571.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), was Schempp's immediate predecessor. Engel involved the daily reading of an official "Regents' Prayer" in the public schools of New Hyde
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had enacted a statute which required Bible readings in the public
schools at the start of each school day. 4 1 This statute was challenged
by the Schempp family as being violative of the first amendment pro42
hibitions against -the establishment of religion.
In deciding that the statutory requirement of reading Bible
verses in the public schools was an impermissible violation of the
establishment clause, 4 3 the Court sharpened the focus of the neutrality principle originally expounded in Everson.4 4 Writing for the
majority, Justice Clark rearticulated the neutrality inquiry as a twotiered test.4 5 To be considered constitutionally valid, a governmental
exercise must satisfy two prerequisites. 4 6 Initially, the legislation
must have a secular purpose, and, secondly, the legislation must have
47
a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Park, New York. Id. at 422-23. The reading of this nondenominational prayer was made mandatory by a policy of the Board of Education of New Hyde Park. Id. The policy was adopted
upon the recommendation of the State Board of Regents. Id. The state officials, in whom New
York had entrusted its supervisory and legislative powers over the public school system, composed the prayer pursuant to their "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools."
Id.
The. Court concluded that the prayer recitation policy was "wholly inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause." Id. at 424. The Court was emphatic to point out that the establishment
clause means at least that a government may not compose an official prayer. Id. at 425. Also, a
state cannot use its power or prestige "to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the
American people- can say." Id. at 429. Finally, the Court stated that the nondenominational
aspect of the prayer could not save it from its establishment clause infirmities. Id. at 430. The
Court concluded that the intolerable evil involved is the act of establishment and not the particular religion or sect which is established. Id. at 436. See also Memorial & Remonstrance,
supra note 31, at 163-64.
41 374 U.S. at 205. Also in question was a Maryland statute which allowed the Board of
School Commissioners of Baltimore City to require Bible readings and/or the recital of the
Lord's Prayer as part of the daily opening exercises within the school system. MD. EDUC.
CODE ANN. 77:202 (1963); see 374 U.S. at 211. Both rules allowed those students not wishing to
partake in the exercises to be excused from the readings. 374 U.S. at 205, 211-12.
42 Id. at 205.
43 Id. at 223.
4 In administering the Everson neutrality test, the Schempp Court stated that the test is to
focus on the purpose and effect of the legislation in question. Id. at 222. As a product of the
implementation of this purpose-effect test, the Court's decision in Schempp, and Engel before
it, vividly points out that for establishment clause violations a law need not reach the end result
of actually establishing religion; it need only be a law respecting the establishment of religion.
See Note, 6 SANTA CLARA LAW. 71, 72 (1965).
45 374 U.S. at 222. The Court gave the following definition to the two-tiered test:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of
the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
Id.
46

Id.

47 Id.
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In administering the neutrality test, the Schempp Court found
the purpose of the legislation to be sufficiently secular under establishment clause principles in that it aimed to improve the moral and
educational values of the community. 48 However, the program failed
the second aspect of the test 4 9 since the Court held that the legislation had a primary effect of advancing those religions whose faith and
tenets were based upon the Bible. 50
The Supreme Court further refined the establishment clause test
in Walz v. Tax Commission. 5 1 The question before the Court in
48 Id. at 223-24. The Court seemed very reluctant to acknowledge that the laws in question
had any secular purpose. However, knowing that resolving that particular question was not
essential to the disposition of the issues at hand, the Court conceded the fact in light of the
effect test. Id.
49 Id., Each aspect of the Bible reading program was viewed as advancing religion. Id. The
Court concluded that the Bible in and of itself served as "an instrument of religion." Id. The
Court also refused to place credence in the argument that the Bible readings were only "relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment." Id. at 225. The Court cautioned that any
"breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent."
Id.
50 Id. at 223-25. The Court found that Bible readings such as in Schempp "are religious
exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the
Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion." Id. at 225. For a
general discussion on the purpose-effect neutrality test, see Note, Establishment Clause
Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1177-85
(1974); Recent Developments, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 396, 398-400 (1970).
The Schempp decision raises the question of when, if ever, a religious group might use
public property for religious purposes without being in contravention of the first amendment.
The Schempp case seems to have been decided by very narrow reasoning, and therefore may be
construed so as not to preclude other types of church-state cooperation. See, e.g., Giannella,
supra note 31, 81 HARV. L. REV. at 570; Comment, Bible Reading and the Lord's Prayer in
Public School, 9 N.Y.L.F. 540, 554-55 (1963); Recent Developments, supra at 401. Such a
concern reached Justice Brennan, who, in his concurrence in Schempp, stated that "not every
involvement of religion in public life violates the Establishment Clause. Our decision . . . does
not clearly forecast anything about the constitutionality of other types of interdependence between religious and other public institutions." 374 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring). With
respect to the governmental neutrality principle, Justice Brennan, while steadfastly believing in
a strict neutrality standard, recognized that there can be exceptions when he stated:
In my view, government cannot sponsor religious exercises in the public schools
without jeopardizing that neutrality. On the other hand, hostility, not neutrality,
would characterize . . . the denial of the temporary use of an empty public building
to a congregation whose place of worship has been destroyed by fire or flood.
Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Two years before the Walz case, the Court decided Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Under review in Allen was a New York statute which allowed for
a textbook loan program to students of any nonprofit school in grades seven through twelve.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1966) (amended 1973 & 1976). Included in the group of
students eligible for the loans were students attending nonprofit religious schools. Id. at 239.
The Court, in applying the two-tiered Schempp test, found that the legislation had the
secular purpose of furthering the educational activities of the young. Id. at 243. Furthermore,
the Court saw no aspect of the legislation as effecting the advancement or inhibition of religion.
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Walz was whether or not New York could constitutionally exclude
religious institutions from paying property tax under a statute which
afforded a property tax exemption to all nonprofit charitable institutions. 5 2 Chief Justice Burger articulated the particular evils which
the establishment clause was aimed at preventing as being "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity." 5 3 The Chief Justice further advocated the use of
the Everson Court's principle of "benevolent neutrality," 54 which he
found to be an "eminently sensible and realistic application of the
55
language of the Establishment Clause."
In applying the Everson principle of "benevolent neutrality," the
Court again declared that its inquiry does not terminate with the review of the purpose of the legislation. 5 6 The end result of the legislation must also be reviewed to determine if the effect of the program
is to foster an "excessive government[al] entanglement" between the
Id. In the analysis of the Court, it was stated that the textbook loan program under review was
analogous to the bus fare reimbursement program in Everson with respect to the purpose and
effect of the program. Id. at 241-44.
It is interesting to note that Justice Black dissented on the grounds that the legislation was
a "flat, flagrant, open violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments," Everson notwithstanding. Id. at 250 (Black, J., dissenting). In distinguishing the two cases, he stated that bus
fares are incidental to educational programs whereas textbooks, even secular textbooks, are at
the heart of the educational process. Id. at 252 (Black, J., dissenting). Therefore, any program
which helps supply textbooks to a sectarian school "will . .. inevitably tend to propagate the
religious views of the favored sect." Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
52 397 U.S. at 667. Although the New York Constitution expressly allowed for the exemption of religious organizations from the payment of property taxes, N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1; id.
at 666-67, the appellants argued that such an exemption indirectly required them to make
support contributions to the religious groups, thereby constituting an impermissible establishment of religion. 397 U.S. at 667.
53 397 U.S. at 668. These evils were cited as the specific meaning of the establishment
clause as the framers of the Constitution knew it. Id.
54 Id. at 669. The Court's use of the term "benevolent neutrality" is a testimony to the
position taken by the Court that while neutrality is the preferred position, there exists a myriad
of situations which allow the state and religion to commingle with each other without violating
first amendment prohibitions. Id. at 668-72.
55 Id. at 671. The Chief Justice admitted that when the Everson Court's holding was
scrutinized in relation to the language and underpinnings of the opinion, the result seemed illogical.
Id. See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting). However, the Walz
Court was quick to point out that if the majority in Everson had construed the establishment
clause as the dissenters there advocated, the result "would [have] undermine[d] the ultimate
constitutional objective as illuminated by history." 397 U.S. at 671. See also McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 241-56 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313-15 (1952). That ultimate goal is to be interpreted as allowing religious institutions to receive the benefactions to which they are entitled as members of society. See Giannella, supra
note 31, 81 HAtv. L. REv. at 514-15. Exclusion of religious groups from social welfare programs, such as was involved in Walz, would tend to promote nonreligion over religion and would
destroy the principal basis for the program. Id. at 518-20.
56 397 U.S. at 674.
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state and religion. 5 7 Under this analysis, the Court found that the
tax exemption, when posed against the alternatives, did not foster an
excessive entanglement between the state and the religious groups
exempted. 58 The statute was therefore upheld as being valid under
the strictures of the establishment clause. 5 9
The test of constitutional validity under the establishment clause
60
entered its present stage of development in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
The Lemon Court stated that the establishment standard consisted of
three aspects: The legislation must have a secular purpose; 6 1 the
legislation must have a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion; 62 and, the legislation must not foster an excessive en57 Id. The excessive entanglement "test is . . . one of degree." Id. This new degree-oriented
analysis in Walz was an attempt by the Court to broaden the scope of the effect test stated in
Schempp. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 167, 168 (1971). Although the tax
exemption was not invalidated under the excessive entanglement test, the Court did attempt to
establish some guidelines for future establishment cases. 397 U.S. at 675. In analyzing whether
a particular church-state relationship involves an excessive entanglement between the government and religion, "the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a
continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree
of entanglement." Id.
58 397 U.S. at 675-76. The Court found none of the specific evils present at which the
establishment clause was directed. Id. The exemption did not constitute sponsorship since there
was no transfer of funds from the State to the religious groups. Id. at 675. Although not expressly stated, the exemption was not viewed by the Court as a sufficient means of financial
support to the religious groups so as to create an excessive entanglement between the government and religion. Id. Generally, the Court found "no genuine nexus between tax exemption
and establishment of religion." Id. Finally, the exemption was viewed as causing "only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches."
Id. at 676.
The viability of the entanglement test has been questioned by some writers. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 50, at 1186-87. Such thinking is based upon the idea that the entanglement
test will never review anything other than the extent of government supervision or surveillance
over religion. Id. at 1186. Other commentators feel that the entanglement test was merely an
extension and clarification of the scope of the inquiry under the effect portion of the Schempp
test. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 57, at 168. The entanglement test, however,
became a clear and distinct level in the establishment clause analysis. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971); see notes 63 & 68-74 infra and accompanying text. The scope of the inquiry
under the excessive entanglement question was enlarged to include, as being sufficient to invalidate the legislation, the potential political divisive nature of the legislation. Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); see notes 72-74 infra and
accompanying text. See also Note, Voucher Systems of Public Education After Nyquist and
Sloan: Can a Constitutional System Be Devised?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 895, 900 (1974).
59 397 U.S. at 680. The Court relied to a large extent upon the historical precedent of
religious tax exemptions in this country in reaching its conclusion. Id. at 676-80. To emphasize
the point, the Court quoted Justice Holmes' statement that " '[i]f a thing has been practised for
two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."' 397 U.S. at 678 (quoting Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922)).
60 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
61 Id. at 612.
62 Id.
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tanglement between government and religion. 6 3 Therefore, the
Lemon Court made the Walz excessive entanglement analysis a separate inquiry and combined it with the Schempp purpose-effect test to
arrive at this new tripartite standard. 4
The Lemon Court was asked to review legislative enactments
from Pennsylvania 65 and Rhode Island 6 6 which provided for reimbursement plans that permitted supplementary expense and salary
payments to be given to nonpublic schools and school teachers. The
Court stated that in analyzing the programs under the establishment
clause test, it must examine the cumulative effect of all the aspects of
the supplementary salary plans to be able to adjudge their constitu67
tionality.
Using this criteria, the Court acknowledged that the states in,volved had sufficiently proper purposes in enacting the statutes. 68
63 id. at 613.

64 Id. at 612-13. The Court cited Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), as implementing for the purpose-effect tests. Id. at 612. While the Allen Court instilled the tests in
arriving at the constitutionality of the New York textbook loan program, it was merely applying
the tests as had been formulated in Schempp. See notes 40-50 supra and accompanying text.
The Lemon Court first stated the excessive entanglement standard as a separate test. 403
U.S. at 613. While this new test was initially articulated as part of the effect test by the Walz
Court, it now has the capacity of limiting the effect test by being made a third and separate
test. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 57, at 167-68, 172.
65 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5608 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1971) (repealed 1977). The

Pennsylvania statute authorized reimbursements to be made directly to nonpublic schools for
their expenditures on teacher salaries, textbooks and instructional materials used in teaching
purely secular subjects. 403 U.S. at 609, 610; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5601 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1971) (repealed 1977). The nonpublic schools had to maintain prescribed accounting procedures to identify the separate secular expenditures. 403 U.S. at 609-10; see PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 5605 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1971) (repealed 1977). These records were subject to review
and audit by state officials. 403 U.S. at 609-10; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5605 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1971) (repealed 1977). These records were subject to review and audit by state
officials. 403 U.S. at 609-10; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5605 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1971)
(repealed 1977).
6 The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, R. I. GEN. LAws §§ 16-51-1 to -51-9 (1970).
The Act provided for the supplementing of nonpublic school teachers' salaries. 403 U.S. at 607.
The payments which were made directly to the teachers could not exceed 15% of the teacher's
current annual salary. Id. To be eligible for the supplementary salary, the teacher had to conduct classes in subjects which were offered at public schools. Id. at 608. The nonpublic school
teachers filed applications with the state for approval of the reimbursement program. Id. The
schools also filed financial and scholastic data with the state for review to see if the school and
teacher met the criteria of the statute. Id. at 607-08.
67 Id. at 613-15. In reviewing the cumulative impact of the relationship between government and religion, the Court stated that the Walz standard mandated "close scrutiny of the
degree of entanglement involved in the relationship." Id. at 614. While the Court recognized
that total separation of church and state was impossible, the objective of the tripartite test under
the establishment clause prohibitions was "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either
into the precincts of the other." Id.
68 Id. at 613. The intent of the legislature was to enhance the quality of secular education in
schools that were covered by the respective states' compulsory attendance laws. Id. In this
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However, the programs of supplementing nonpublic school teachers
salaries were found to violate the establishment clause due to their
tendency to cause an excessive entanglement between government
and religion. 69 This entanglement arose through the comprehensive
surveillance and monitoring system 70 which the states were forced to
administer to ensure that the aid to the teachers would not be used
for any sectarian purposes. 71 The Court also reasoned that the programs had the capacity to cause great political divisiveness among the
various religious groups. 72 Freedom from such political fragmentation in response to government aid to religion was one of the princi-

regard the Court found that there was no basis to conclude that any aspect of the program was
designed to advance religion. Id.
69 Id. at 616-22.
70 Id.
The substantial religious nature of the church-oriented schools forced the necessity of
these monitoring controls. Id. at 616, 620-21. The legislatures, in giving the aid to secular
aspects of the school only, were forced to set up surveillance procedures to be assured the aid
would not fall to sectarian use. Id. If the aid were used for sectarian purposes, it would be an
impermissible fostering of religion by the state. Id. at 618-19.
71 Id.
at 616-22, Because of the teacher-school relationship and the potential for abuse of
the aid, "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance [would] inevitably
be required to ensure that [the] restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise
respected." Id. at 619. Such precautionary measures would cause an "excessive and enduring
entanglement between state and church," which would violate the minimal contacts aspect of
the excessive entanglement test of Walz. Id.; Current Decisions, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679,
680 (1971).
A second aspect of the Pennsylvania statute, that of direct payment of the aid to the sectarian school before it was put to its secular use, was also declared violative of the establishment
clause. 403 U.S. at 621. Virtually always, direct subsidies to religious groups are violative of the
first amendment. Id. Direct subsidies are what the Court is guarding against when it speaks of
having no sponsorship or financial support of religion by government, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. at 675, and no concert between religion and government. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 312 (1952). Again, the Court pointed out that for Pennsylvania to ensure the secular use of
these subsidies, it would have to maintain a system of control and surveillance which would
violate the establishment clause by excessively entangling the state and the nonpublic schools.
403 U.S. at 621-22.
72 Id.
at 622-24. This is the first instance where the majority of the Court stated that political divisiveness must be reviewed as an excessive entanglement criteria. It had, however, been
advocated in prior cases by various Justices as grounds for invalidation of a program. See Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at
249 (Harlan, J., concurring); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concur-

ring).
Contributing to the Court's conclusion that the potential for political divisiveness was great
enough to be considered under the excessive entanglement test was the absence of any historical precedent for the supplementary salary program. 403 U.S. at 624. In comparison to the tax
exemption in Walz, which had a two hundred year historical existence, the Lemon programs
were innovations in the realm of church-state relations. Id. at 624. In making its determination
that the program contributed to potential political divisiveness, the Court pointed to the fact
that only a limited number of religions would be aided by the salary programs. Id. at 623. This,
again, is unlike the statute in Walz which afforded the tax exemption to all religions, thereby
minimizing the threat of political divisiveness. Id. at 623-24.
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pal objectives of the religion clauses. 73 Therefore, the Court held
that any legislation falling under establishment clause scrutiny must
74
be free from promulgating this political divisiveness.
73 403 U.S. at 622. The Court's decision was effected by the possibility that the legislature's
attention would be diverted from issues and problems of concern by questions under the religion clauses. Id. at 623. The fear of this fragmentation prompted the Court to point out that
"[t]he history of many countries attests to the hazards of religion's intruding into the political
arena or of political power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of religious belief."
Id.; see note 32 supra and accompanying text.
74 403 U.S. at 622-24.

Decided on the same day as Lemon was Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). In
Tilton, the federal government had enacted a statute which provided for grants to be made to
colleges and universities to aid in the expansion of their facilities. Id. at 675. See 20 U.S.C.
§§ 711-21 (1964 & Supp. V 1964) (repealed Supp. II 1972). Private, religious-oriented colleges
would be eligible for such a grant. 403 U.S. at 675-76; 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-21 (1964 & Supp. V
1964) (repealed Supp. II 1972). The statute prohibited the use of the buildings for other than
secular purposes for twenty years. 403 U.S. at 675; 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-21 (1964 & Supp. V 1964)
(repealed Supp. 11 1972).
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court applied the tripartite test which it had just reformed in Lemon. 403 U.S. at 678. The Court found the government's aim to maintain and advance
higher education to be a sufficiently secular purpose to meet the establishment clause standards.
Id. at 678-79. In analyzing the primary effect of the grant program, the Court stated that the
crucial test is not whether the religious institution gains some benefit which is incidental to the
legislation, but whether the primary or principal effect on the legislation advances religion. Id.
at 679-80. The Court found no evidence within the facts of the case to show that the educational institutions were so pervasively religious that their secular and religious functions could
not be separated. Id. at 680-81. There was simply no showing that religion would find its way
into these facilities. Id.
The Court then examined the grant legislation under the excessive entanglement standard. Id. at 684-89. In holding that the legislation did not involve excessive entanglements
between the government and religion, the Court distinguished the Tilton grant program from
the subsidies involved in Lemon. Compare Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 685-89 wiih
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 620-24. The risk that this governmental aid would serve to
support religion was lower than that in Lemon. 403 U.S. at 687. The Court also reasoned that because
in the college situation there is more academic freedom than in secondary schools, little affirmative religious preaching, and people of older years who are less impressionable than high school
students, the risk of unsuspecting religious indoctrination was decreased. Id. at 685-86. This
reduces the need for intensive surveillance techniques by the government, thereby decreasing
the entanglements involved between the government and the schools. Id. at 687.
The majority in Tilton also concluded that the nonideological character of the aid was important in reducing the constitutional infirmities of the program. Citing Everson and Allen, the
Court stated:
Our cases .. .have permitted church-related schools to receive government aid in
the form of secular, neutral, or nonideological services, facilities, or materials that
are supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation of the school that they attend.
Id.; see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
Lastly, the potentiality of political divisiveness was determined not to be of the same magnitude when dealing with colleges and universities as opposed to secondary schools. 403 U.S. at
688-89. The Court believed that the local religious constituency of the parochial school posed
far greater problems of potential political fragmentation than did the diverse population on a
college campus. Id. at 689.
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While the Supreme Court has never been required to rule directly upon the question of the constitutionality of religious groups
using liublic buildings for worship purposes, numerous lower courts
have decided cases involving this situation. 75 At first glance, the
cases appear to lack any consistency in separating the functions of
church and state. 76 However, when reviewed more closely, there
emerges a clear interpretation that under first amendment guidelines,
religion and government may become intermingled so long as their
relationship is not an excessively dependent or controlling force upon
77
one another.
One prime example of such a state court's application of the establishment clause neutrality principle occurred in Southside Estates
Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees. 7 8 In Southside Estates, the
Supreme Court of Florida had occasion to rule upon the constitutionality of a local school board's rental policy which allowed religious
groups to use the public school buildings when they were not being
79
used for school purposes.

The Court did, however, qualify its decision by requiring that the twenty-year limitation
against religious use be replaced by an ad infinitum restriction. Id. at 683-84, 689. The use of
such a facility for religious purposes after the twenty-year period had elapsed would still violate
the establishment clause. Id. at 683. For a discussion of the Lemon and Tilton decisions and
their effect upon the establishment clause standard, see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra
note 57, at 170-79.
75 For a general overview of the early state decisions, see note 28 supra.
76 See, e.g., Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 53-57 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (students
permitted to conduct prayer sessions in public school prior to commencement of school day);
Lewis v. Mandeville, 201 Misc. 120, 123, 107 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (use of
auditorium in firehouse by religious groups held constitutional).
But the general trend of state court cases decided prior to Everson generally ruled that the
state had no power to allow the religious groups to use public buildings. See note 28 supra.
77 See Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965); Lewis v. Mandeville,
201 Misc. 120, 123, 107 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp
Meeting Ass'n, 72 N.J. 237, 290-91, 370 A.2d 449, 477-78 (1977). The state courts seemingly
felt that to deny the religious organizations the benefits they otherwise deserved would be
instilling hostility in the state's dealing with the religious groups as members of society. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Mandeville, 201 Misc. at 123, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 868. See also Giannella,
supra note 32, 81 HARV. L. REV. at 515, 518; Note, supra note 34, 60 HARV. L. REV. at
795-97; Note, supra note 34, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. at 331, 332-33.
78 115 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
79 Id. at 698. The board of trustees permitted several religious groups to use the public
school buildings on Sundays. Id. The use was temporary, pending the completion of the groups'
church buildings. Id. No record of rent paid by the religious groups nor direct expense to the
school board was shown. Id.
The board policy was challenged on two grounds. First, it was argued that the rental program violated the Florida Constitution, which provides:
No preference shall be given by law to any church, sect or mode of worship
and no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in
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The court in Southside Estates concluded that any benefit which
the religious groups received from the use of the school buildings was
only an incidental benefit which was attributed to the groups solely
because they were members of the class of organizations which was
allowed to make use of the facilities under the statute. 8 0 The court
further declared that the first amendment had not been violated by
the rental program since no public funds had been used in an establishment of religion or in the perference of one religion over another.8 "
The Resnick court was presented with two constitutional issues. 8 2 The East Brunswick Board of Education's program was initially alleged as being violative of the New Jersey Constitution.8 3 The
court was also asked to declare that the program constituted an establishment of religion in violation of the religion clauses of the first
amendment. 84
The New Jersey constitutional provisions concerning permissible
state involvement with religion are far less pervasive than the prohiaid of any church, sect or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6, quoted in 115 So. 2d at 698-99.

Second, the plaintiffs argued that such *a use of public facilities by the religious groups
violated the prohibitions within the establishment clause of the first amendment made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 698.
8o 115 So. 2d at 700-01. The religious groups were properly included under the statutory
language " 'any legal assembly' " by the school board. Id. at 700 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 235.02 (West 1940)). with respect to the benefit that the religious groups would receive by
using the school buildings, the court stated that it could "properly apply the maxim de minimus
non curat lex." 115 So. 2d at 699.
81 Id. at 701. The court found "nothing in the conduct of the appellee trustees to suggest
the involvement of public funds or property in the establishment of religion or in preferring one
religious faith over another." Id.
The court also held that the Florida constitutional prohibition against the use of public
funds to aid any religious denomination had not been violated by the religious groups using the
school buildings. Id. at 699; see FLA. CONST. § 6; notes 83-85 infra and accompanying text.
The court placed a caveat on the use of the school buildings by religious groups when it
stated "by way of dictum" that the use of the buildings "for prolonged periods of time, absent
evidence of an immediate intention on the part of the Church to construct its own building"
would be sufficient to take such a use out of the permissible area of church-state relationships
under the establishment clause. 115 So. 2d at 700.
82 Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 96, 389 A.2d 944, 948 (1978).
The court also heard arguments contending that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20-34 (West 1968), did
not contemplate the use of school buildings for religious worship but merely permitted religious
education sessions to be conducted within the schools. 77 N.J. at 96, 389 A.2d at 948. However, the majority did not accept this statutory construction argument and held that religious
worshipping in public schools after school hours did not violate title 18A, section 20-34. Id. at
98-102, 389 A.2d at 949-50. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see note 22 supra and
accompanying text.
83 77 N.J. at 96, 389 A.2d at 948.
84 Id.
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bitions under the establishment and free exercise clauses of the federal constitution.8 5 Therefore, the court in Resnick was faced with a
very narrow issue with respect to the New Jersey Constitution. 8 6
Justice Pashman, writing for the majority, found that there had been
no preference of one religion over another resulting from the Board's
rental policy.8 7 Additionally, he cited the state constitution as prohibiting the use of local taxes to support any religion. 8 8 This provision had been violated by the Board's failure to require the religious
groups using the schools to fully reimburse the Board for its out-ofpocket costs. 89 However, the majority allowed for an upward
amendment of the rental fee to alleviate this infirmity without destroying the rental program. 90
The major issue, as perceived by the court, was whether or not
the policy of renting the school facilities to religious groups was violative of the first amendment of the federal constitution. 9 1 The court,
finding no coercion respecting religion in the East Brunswick rental
policy, dispensed with the necessity of analyzing the rentals under

85 Id. at 104, 389 A.2d at 952. In so holding, the court adopted the late Chief Justice
Weintraub's limiting definition of the scope of the state's constitutional prohibition on the government's ability to intertwine itself with religion as stated in Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N.J. 523,
528, 267 A.2d 503, 505-06 (1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 945 (1971), aff'd on remand, 59 N.J. 583,
285 A.2d 11 (1971); 77 N.J. at 104, 389 A.2d at 952. See also Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp
Meeting Ass'n, 72 N.J. 237, 370 A.2d 449 (1977). In Schaad, the New Jersey supreme court
perceived that the New Jersey constitutional provisions did not pertain to the establishment
issue at hand and analyzed those issues under the Supreme Court's tripartite first amendment
test. 72 N.J. at 251-62, 370 A.2d at 456-62; State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J.
Super. 564, 577-78, 262 A.2d 21, 28 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970)
(chancery division mandated that in order to invalidate prayer readings in public schools lower
courts must follow stare decisis and defer to Supreme Court precedents when rule of decision is
clear).
86 77 N.J. at 103-04, 389 A.2d at 951-52. The New Jersey Constitution limits the acts of the
state with reference to religion in that it prohibits the use of any tax monies in support of any
church or religion. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 3. It additionally mandates that no one religion
may be given preference over any other religion. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 4.
87 77 N.J. at 104, 389 A.2d at 952.
88 Id. at 103, 389 A.2d at 951, citing N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 3.
89 Id. Since any expense which was directly attributable to the religious groups' use of the
school which was not reimbursed would constitute state support of those religious groups, the
program was held invalid, at least to the extent of the unpaid expenses. Id.
90 Id. at 103, 389 A.2d at 951. The majority affirmed the lower court's opinion insofar as it
held that the rate structure was not integral to the rental program and could therefore be
increased to cover the total out-of-pocket costs of the Board without changing the significant
aspects of the program. Id.; see Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super.
257, 265, 343 A.2d 127, 131 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 343 A.2d 127 (App.
Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978).
91 77 N.J. at 104, 389 A.2d at 952.
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its
the free exercise clause standards. 92 In turn, the court confined
93
constitutional discussion to the establishment clause issue.
Justice Pashman reasoned that the court must review the program in. light of the tripartite test mandated in the establishment of
religion analysis articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Walz and Lemon. 94 The requirement of a secular purpose for the
legislation is not a very rigid test, requiring merely an articulation of
little more than a "colorable secular design." 9 5 The majority found
the East Brunswick School rental policy to have the secular purpose
of maximizing the usefulness of public buildings and aiding the com96
munity charities.
The primary purpose of the statutory authority was to grant wide
discretion to local school boards in deciding how to use dormant
school facilities. 9 7 The majority declared the primary effect of the
statute was to extend the benefits of using these buildings to charitable community groups.9 8 The Board's policy was, therefore, viewed
as aiding all nonprofit organizations in East Brunswick. 9 9 Justice
Pashman concluded that the benefit which enured to the religious

92 Id. at 105, 389 A.2d at 952. The court looked to School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1968), for its definition of a free exercise case. The Schempp Court stated that "it is necessary
in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against
him in the practice of his religion." Id. at 223.
93 77 N.J. at 105, 389 A.2d at 952.
94 Id. at 107-08, 389 A.2d at 953-54. For a more in-depth discussion concerning the tripartite test, see notes 47-76 supra and accompanying text. The majority also echoed the sentiments of the Supreme Court by enumerating that "[t]he objective of these tests has been ...
[the] protection against 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity.' " 77 N.J. at 108, 389 A.2d at 954 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 377 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
95 77 N.J. at 108, 389 A.2d at 954. In the process of upholding the secular purpose of the
statute, the court stated that the establishment clause test required that a court defer to any
reasonable articulation of a proper legislative intent in enacting the statute. Id. at 108-09, 389
A.2d at 954; see, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (nonpublic school pupils
included in general program of educational aid distribution); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (although Court invalidated New York program
which gave repair and maintenance grants to nonpublic schools, it found purpose of program as
articulated by legislature to be sufficient under tripartite test); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) (state statute providing financial support to nonpublic schools for specified secular
subjects found unconstitutional). See also Note, supra note 50, at 1178 & n.26.
96 77 N.J. at 109-10, 389 A.2d at 954. The court also stated that there had been no allega-.
tions proffered of bad faith on the part of the Board, thereby giving the court "no reason to
doubt [the policy's] stated purposes." Id.
97 Id. at 111, 389 A.2d at 955.
98 Id.
" Id. Not only were the community charities viewed as the beneficiaries of the Board's
rental policy, but the court stated that "[tihe community as a whole is benefitted when nonprofit organizations of interest to its members prosper." Id.
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groups was an incidental derivative of the general program. 100 By allowing the religious institutions to use the school buildings under
such circumstances, the Board's policy did not amount to an impermissible advancement of religion.' 0 ' The majority reasoned that
since there was no substantial outlay of public funds, the " 'significantly religious' character" of the groups should not preclude them
from gaining benefits which other groups in the same class were enti10 2
tled to receive.
Additionally, the majority examined the rental policy under the
third level of the establishment clause test; namely, did the use of the
school buildings by the religious groups foster an excessive entanglement between religion and government? 10 3 Justice Pashman found
no administrative entanglement due to the nonexistence of any important administrative function in approving the rental applications.' 0 4 Furthermore, there was no need for the Board to conduct a
10 Id.
101 Id. It was viewed that the religious institutions were simply members of the larger group
of organizations eligible to rent the school buildings such as girl scouts, boy scouts, garden
clubs, basketball teams, drama clubs, drum and bugle corps and language schools. Id.
102 Id. at 114, 389 A.2d at 957. The aid to the religious groups was viewed as a benefit
which
any charity would receive when using the schools. Id. at 112-14, 389 A.2d at 956-57. Therefore, the religious institutions, being members of that class of organizations for whom the aid
has been made available, should not be denied the use of the buildings merely because of their
religious substructure. Id.; see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 672-74; Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. at 6-7, 14; Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So. 2d
697 (Fla. 1959). In fact, this area of friendly and detached cooperation with the efforts of parents
and religious groups has been viewed as entirely consistent with the first amendment. Fahy,
Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAw & CON"EMP. PROB. 73, 91 (1949); Giannella, supra note 31, 81 HARV. L. REV. at 514-20.
Extending such a rationale, the withholding of such benefits from religious groups which
would otherwise be offered to them but for their religious nature can be viewed as governmental hostility towards religion not demanded by the prohibitions of the establishment clause. See
Giannella, supra note 31, 81 HARV. L. REV. at 515, 518-22.
103 77 N.J. at 114, 389 A.2d at 957. This excessive entanglement analysis was the primary
focus of the trial court's objection to the East Brunswick rental policy. Id. The trial judge found
three levels of entanglement between church and state when the religious groups are allowed to
rent for such long periods of time. Resnick v. East Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J.
Super. 257, 258, 343 A.2d 127, 133 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 474, 366 A.2d 345
(App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978). Firstly, the program involved excessive bookkeeping and scheduling concerning the religious organizations, thereby resulting in an
administrative entanglement. Id. Secondly, a political entanglement would ensue as the school
principal and board members would be subject to the "demands and pressures" of both the
religious institutions and those opposing the religious group's use of any public school facilities.
Id. Finally, the court found the mere ongoing presence of the groups and the storing of religious artifacts in school storerooms to be a relationship which excessively entangled church and
the state. Id.
104 77 N.J. at 116, 389 A.2d at 958. If a religious group applied for a time slot which was
not
already occupied by another group, the granting of the application was to a large extent a pro
forma procedure. Id. Thus, the granting of an application to rent a school building is more
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comprehensive surveillance program for the groups used the buildings during nonschool hours, thereby alleviating the fear of religious
indoctrination of the unbelieving or unwilling. 10 5 Justice Pashman
did not find a significant potential for any political divisiveness occurring as a result of this rental program. 106 Consequently, he disagreed with the trial court's decision that the storing of religious artifacts was an entanglement sufficient to warrant the invalidation of
the Board's rental program. 10 7 In fact, without a showing that the
storage space used was needed by the schools, the housing of such
religious articles was viewed as merely accommodating religion rather
10 8
than advancing it.
However, the majority did place a limitation upon the length of
time one religious group could use the school buildings. 109 Following the reasoning of Southside Estates, Justice Pashman declared that
the use must be temporary and that the religious groups must show
an immediate intent in procuring their own buildings. 110 It was
viewed that should the rental extend beyond a temporary use, the religious groups would effectively be receiving the school Board's stamp
of approval."' While not wanting to define a fixed, mechanical stanministerial than it is discretionary. Id. The court reasoned, therefore, that there is no significant
administrative function in having a clerk process such an application. Id.
105 Id. In distinguishing Schempp, Lemon, Engel and the other United States Supreme
Court decisions concerning state aid to religious schools, Justice Pashman noted that the religious instruction occurred during nonschool hours, ensuring that its religious nature was not
likely to engraft itself into secular education. Id.
106 Id. The political divisiveness aspect of the excessive entanglement test was initially used
by Chief Justice Burger in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-25 (1971). The Resnick
majority cites that the reason for the Lemon Court's "fear of political fragmentation . ..was . ..
'the need for annual appropriations."' 77 N.J. at 116, 389 A.2d at 958 (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 623). Justice Pashman, finding no appropriations necessary within the
East Brunswick scheme, held that the rental program did not foster any political fragmentation.
Id. at 116, 389 A.2d at 958. He also noted that the absence of any discretionary function by
the school principals in granting the application lessened the possibilities of political disfavor.
Id. Finally, there was no showing in the record that historically there had been any divisiveness
in the township over the use of public buildings by religious groups. Id. at 116-17, 389 A.2d at
958.
at 117, 389 A.2d at 958.
107 Id.
108 Id.
Justice Pashman termed the cooperation between the schools and the religious bodies
in the storing of the artifacts as "a minimal accommodation" of religion. Id. Since these religious
articles would not be on general display during the school day, the temporary holding of them
by the schools did not amount to a constitutional infirmity. Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. The majority found that the religious groups under review had all made diligent efforts and good faith preparations in their attempt to find their own houses of worship. Id. In
fact, the fear of a religious group using a school on a permanent basis was seen to be very
"hollow." Id. at 118, 389 A.2d at 959.
"I Id. at 117, 389 A.2d at 958-59. Justice Pashman expressed the fear that a continuous use
of the property would be tantamount to the school system promoting religion. Id. However, the
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dard which must be followed in every situation, 11 2 the court inferred
that a rental arrangement lasting five years was reaching the limit of a
13
permissible use of the schools.1
In his dissent, Justice Clifford argued that the decision of the
majority was another step toward the destruction of the necessary
separation between church and state. 114 He contended that there
was no statutory authority for permitting religious worship in public
school buildings 115 and that the majority's decision circumvented the
intent of the legislature in enacting section 18A:20-34.116
Respecting the first amendment tripartite test, Justice Clifford
found, as did the majority, a proper secular legislative purpose in the
enacting of the statute and the adoption of the East Brunswick rules
policy. 1 17 However, he argued that the renting of the school
majority also discounted Justice Clifford's dissenting argument that the rental policy of granting
indefinite rental arrangements equaled granting a lease for all time. Id. at 117-18 & n.8, 389
A.2d at 458-59; id. at 121-22, 389 A.2d at 961 (Clifford, J., dissenting). It was felt that with the
inordinate amount of possible mishaps which might attend land purchases and building construction plans, the indefinite lease as used by East Brunswick was a sensible accommodation of
religion under the circumstances. Id.
112 Id. at 117-18, 389 A.2d at 958-59. The court placed the burden of deciding what the
specific time guidelines should be upon the trial court within each individual fact pattern. Id.
113 Id. at 118, 389 A.2d at 959. The Board's leasing arrangement with the Reform Temple
commencing in 1973 was viewed as "approaching the outer bounds of reasonable time and
nearing the point of prohibited entanglement." Id.
114 Id. at 121, 389 A.2d at 960. This policy-based argument is similar in nature to those
advanced by several Justices when state-religion accommodation programs have been upheld in
the past. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 708-09 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In
Walz, Justice Douglas argued that with respect to general social legislation and its benefits,
there is a difference between nonprofit organizations as a whole and religious groups. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
11577 N.J. at 126, 389 A.2d at 963. Justice Clifford agreed with the majority that the provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20-34(a) (West 1968), could be interpreted to include the use of
public schools for religious education and instruction. 77 N.J. at 26, 389 A.2d at 963 (Clifford,
J., dissenting); see notes 20 & 98 supra and accompanying text. However, he disagreed that the
statutory provisions authorized the leasing of a school facility for housing religious worship. 77
N.J. at 126, 389 A.2d at 963 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
116 77 N.J. at 127, 389 A.2d at 963 (Clifford, J., dissenting). To Justice Clifford, the majority,
by discarding the use of the settled statutory construction aid, ejusdem generis, overexpansively
interpreted subsections (a) and (c) of section 20-34. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting). He found the
statutory language unclear, thereby calling for the application of such a definitional aid. Id.
(Clifford, J., dissenting). Under the ejusdem generis doctrine, Justice Clifford contended that
religious services were not of the general type of activities which subsections (a) and (c) of
section 20-34 were intended to include as permissible in the school buildings. Id. (Clifford, J.,
dissenting).
117 Id. at 129, 389 A.2d at 969 (Clifford, J., dissenting). It was undisputed that the underlying purpose of the legislation was to use the public school facilities to their optimum level by
allowing diverse groups from the community to rent the buildings during nonschool hours. Id.
(Clifford, J., dissenting); see notes 109-10 supra and accompanying text.
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facilities to the religious groups was violative of the establishment
clause because it impermissibly advanced religion."'
For Justice
Clifford, the analysis was not to seek the ultimate effect of the legislation but to review whether or not -a primary effect of the legislation
effectively advances religion. 119 Consequently, he cited the rental
program as conferring direct and immediate benefits upon the religious groups in the form of economic savings through lessened rentals,12 0 the opportunity to communicate to an otherwise unreachable
larger audience, 12 1 and indirect endorsements of religion by the
22
school board. '
Justice Clifford also disagreed with the majority's reasoning that
the rental program was not invalid under the excessive entanglement
test.123 Due to the extensive record keeping and communication be118 77 N.J. at 130-35, 389 A.2d at 965-67 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 131-33, 389 A.2d at 965-66 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford reasoned that
the East Brunswick program conferred a great aid to religion and therefore had a primary effect
of advancing religion. Id. at 131, 389 A.2d at 965. Disagreeing with the majority, he stated that
the focus of the primary effect test should not be a finding of "the primary effect," but a
reviewing of all the aspects of the program to see whether or not it causes a "direct and immediate" advancement of religion. Id. at 131-32, 389 A.2d at 965-66 (Clifford, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original); see notes 112-16 supra and accompanying text.
In support of the aforementioned principle, Justice Clifford relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973). 77 N.J. at 131-34, 389 A.2d at 965-67. In Nyquist, the Court declared that the primary
effect test did not mandate an ultimate judgment with respect to the primary effect of the
statute in question. 413 U.S. at 783-85 n.39. In holding that any statute having the effect of
directly and immediately advancing religion was unconstitutional, the Court found a New York
statute calling for direct grants to nonpublic sectarian schools to be violative of the first amendment. Id.; see N.Y. EDUC. LAW. ANN. §§ 12:549-53, 559-63 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 19721973).
Therefore, Justice Clifford pointed out that the error in the majority's analysis was that it
directed its inquiry from the perspective of the taxpayers who financed the building and
maintenance of the schools. 77 N.J. at 130 n.5, 389 A.2d at 965 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Rather, he argued, the primary effect test must be reviewed "from the perspective of the
beneficiaries of the program." Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). If their position was advanced, the program violated the prohibitions of the establishment clause. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting).
12077 N.J. at 130, 132-33, 389 A.2d at 965, 966 (Clifford, J., dissenting). By the Board not
assessing a fair rental rate upon the religious groups, Justice Clifford contended that the majority mistakenly permitted a significant economic benefit to be conferred upon the groups. Id. at
130, 389 A.2d at 965 (Clifford, J., dissenting); see notes 112-16 supra and accompanying text.
12177 N.J. at 130-31, 389 A.2d at 965 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford reasoned that
the program invalidly "afford[ed] the religious bodies an otherwise unavailable public forum for
expounding their tenets." Id. at 131, 389 A.2d at 965 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
122 Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting). By allowing such elongated rentals by the various religious
groups, the program undeniably has the effect of "placing the imprimatur of government upon
religion in general." Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting). For Justice Clifford, the rental agreements
involved in the present case had trespassed into the area that "'implicate[d] the Board in the
promotion of religion."' Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 133, 389 A.2d at 966 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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tween the religious groups and the schools, Justice Clifford determined that an impermissible administrative entanglement was present. 124 He also stated that the discretionary power of the principal
in authorizing the rental applications and the outside pressure which
was likely to be directed towards that position created a great potential for political fragmentation within the community. 125 Finally, Justice Clifford contended that Southside Estates was not applicable to
the facts at hand.126 Southside Estates, as he interpreted the decision, had mandated only that the use of the schools by the religious
27
groups be temporary in order to be constitutionally permissible.'
According to Justice Clifford, the length of the various uses of the
East Brunswick school buildings could be categorized as anything but
temporary. 128
It is questionable whether the Resnick court has treaded upon
forbidden first amendment ground, as the dissent apparently be-

124 id.

(Clifford, J., dissenting). Adding strength to the argument that the relationship be-

tween the schools and religious institutions involved an entanglement was the need to store
religious artifacts on the school premises. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford reasoned
that such storage mandated the Board's supervision over the safety and display of the artifacts.
Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 133-34, 389 A.2d at 966-67 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The variables which amount
to an entanglement due to political divisiveness were: the pressures attendant upon a principal
in the application granting process when two groups request the same times, id. at 133-34, 389
A.2d at 966 (Clifford, J., dissenting); the possible pressure exerted by religious groups who
annually apply for a lease to the same principal, id. at 133-34, 389 A.2d at 966-67 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting); and the potential divisive reaction by the taxpayers to any use of the school facilities
by the religious bodies. Id. at 134, 389 A.2d at 967 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 135, 389 A.2d at 967 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The majority had relied very heavily
upon Southside Estates in concluding that the Board's rental program was constitutional. Id. at
117-18, 389 A.2d at 958-59; Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So.2d
at 699-701; see notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
527 77 N.J. at 135, 389 A.2d at 967 (Clifford, J., dissenting). In Southside Estates, the Florida
supreme court stated that any use of the school buildings by religious groups had to be temporary and coexistent with an immediate intent on the part of the religious bodies to secure their
own worship buildings. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting); Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board
of Trustees, 115 So.2d at 700.
128 77 N.J. at 135, 389 A.2d at 967 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The pace taken by the religious
organizations was found by Justice Clifford to be "a leisurely pace, at best." Id. (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). Finally, he stated the precedential value of Southside Estates was nil because the
case was decided well before the formulation of the "currently applicable three-part establishment clause test." Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Judge Conford of the appellate division, who was temporarily assigned to the supreme
court, joined in the opinion of Justice Clifford, but stated that in his interpretation of the
establishment clause prohibitions, any sectarian use of public buildings violated the concept of
separation of church and state found in both the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 136-37,
389 A.2d at 968 (Conford, J., dissenting).
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lieves, 12 9 or has logically extended the concept of benevolent neutrality. In upholding the validity of the Board's program, the majority
reasoned that any aid which the religious groups derived from using
the school facilities was an incidental benefit from the program. 130
Because the religious bodies were within the general class of organizations eligible to rent the buildings, the benefits to these religious
groups were viewed as secondary to the primary effect of benefiting
the community. 131
However, as pointed out by Justice Clifford, the majority seemed
to improperly limit its focus to "the primary effect" of the rental program. 13 2 As set out by the United States Supreme Court, any primary effect of the program which advances religion is violative of the
establishment clause. 133 Therefore, the proper question is what constitutes a primary effect. 13 4 For Justice Clifford, an effect is a primary effect if it directly and immediately advances religion. 13 5
While Justice Clifford was more literal in his definition of the
primary effect test, the majority's analysis, in application, appears to
be more in line with the Supreme Court decisions.1 36 Benefits con129 Id. at 121, 389 A.2d at 960 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford renounced the result
reached by the majority as being "another fissure in the wall of separation between church and
state." Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting).
530 Id. at 111, 389 A.2d at 955; see notes 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
131 77 NJ. at 111, 114, 389 A.2d at 955, 957; see notes 100-02 supra and accompanying text.
132 77 N.J. at 131, 389 A.2d at 965 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). It was
pointed out that such an ultimate finding was unnecessary because if any aspect of the rental
program had a direct and immediate effect of advancing religion, the program would be violative of the establishment clause. Id. at 131-32, 389 A.2d at 965-66 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
133 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v, Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-85
n.39 (1973).
134 The crux of the primary effect test lies in the differentiation between those aspects of the
program which primarily advance religion and those aspects which incidentally afford religion
various benefits. Government aid falling within the former classification is invalid under the
establishment clause test while aid of the latter type has traditionally been upheld. Compare
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-89 (1971) and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674-80 (1970) and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244-49 (1968) and Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1952) and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947) with
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-99 (1973) and
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-25 (1971) and School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
216-27 (1963) and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-36 (1962).
135 77 N.J. at 132, 389 A.2d at 966. Following the Nyquist approach, Justice Clifford found
the program ran afoul of the first amendment notwithstanding the fact that its primary purpose
was legitimate. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting); see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-85 n.39.
136 The Supreme Court, while operating under the standard advocated by Justice Clifford,
has held general welfare program benefits to be sustainable on the basis that the advantages
received by the religious organizations were not direct enough to find the program primarily
advanced religion. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971) (higher education construction grant program held constitutional as it applied to religiously oriented colleges
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ferred upon religious bodies through the application of general welfare legislation have been held by the Court to be incidental and
indirect.13 7 The amount of aid to the religious institutions apparently
has not been determinative of a first amendment violation as long 1as
38
that aid has been indirectly conferred upon the religious bodies.
Therefore, the advantage gained by the religious groups in Everson, 139 Zorach, 140 Allen, 141 and Tilton, 14 2 while being substantial,
was upheld because in each case it was viewed as an indirect and
14 3
incidental derivative of the general welfare legislation involved.
Conversely, the statutory programs in McCollum,144 Schempp,145 and
Lemon 146 were struck down because the government had proposed to
aid religion in too direct a manner to be valid under the establishment clause. 147
The benefit gained by the religious groups in Resnick seems to
be sustainable under this primary effect test. The East Brunswick
rental program was designed to make available to all charitable
groups in the community the use of public school property in order
to make use of dormant facilities. 14 8 Being of this general class, the
religious groups could rightfully rent the school facilities. 149 Any ben-

and universities); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-74 (1970) (tax exemption for charitable organizations valid as extended to religious institutions). Therefore, the Resnick majority's
differentiation of what is the primary effect versus any primary effect-was probably unnecessary.
137 See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 672-74 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968); Everson v.

Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947).
138 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971) (where Court's validation of construction loan program potentially allowed millions of dollars to be granted to religiously based
schools for building of new facilities); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-74 (1970) (disregarding that potential financial gain by religious groups via tax exemption could be quite substantial, Court
139 330 U.S.
140 343 U.S.
14, 392 U.S.

ruled that such exemptions were valid under first amendment).
1 (1948).
306 (1952).
236 (1968).

142 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
143 See notes 30-76 supra and accompanying text.
144 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
145 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
146 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
147 See notes 42-76 supra and accompanying text.
148 77 N.J. at 93, 389 A.2d at 946 (quoting East Brunswick Board of Education, Rules and
Regulations § III(C)(1)); see note I supra and accompanying text.
149 77 N.J. at 120-21, 389 A.2d at 960. It has been argued that to deny religious organizations the receipt of the benefits they are rightfully entitled to as members of society would be
government hostility towards religion and the fostering of irreligion above religion. See Giannella, supra note 31, 81 HARV. L. REV. at 516-28; Current Decisions, supra note 71, at 680-

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:524

efits derived therefrom by the religious bodies are clearly indirect
150
and incidental to the rental program.
The majority also decided that, contrary to the dissenting view,
there was no substantial possibility of an administrative entanglement
occurring. 15 1 The "ministerial" act of granting the applications and
the limited contact between the schools and the religious institutions
were viewed as being insufficient to warrant a ruling of constitutional
invalidity. 152 Again, the Resnick court's analysis is seemingly in line
with the establishment clause test. The Supreme Court has never
required total separation of church and state.1 53 In fact, with respect
to public welfare programs, absolute separation between the two is
virtually impossible.1 5 4 Accordingly, the storage of religious artifacts,
sans any encroachment upon needed school space,' 5 5 seems to be the
mere accommodation of the religious groups that the majority found
156
it to be.
However, the dissenters felt that there was a grave potential for
political divisiveness in East Brunswick as a result of the rental program. 1 57 Initially, there would be political pressures applied to the
principals by the various religious bodies in order to gain a prefer-

150 77 N.J. at 111, 389 A.2d at 955; see notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
151 77 N.J. at 118, 389 A.2d at 959. The majority saw '[n]o significant administrative function
... involved" in the program which would support an argument of administrative entanglement. Id. at 116, 389 A.2d at 958.
s52 Id. at 116, 118-19, 389 A.2d at 958.
153 See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
760-61 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 670, 676 (1970).
15 Given the scope of governmental regulation and programming, it seems highly improbable that the church and state can escape any contact between each other. Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. at 676. General welfare legislation by definition must involve some minimal contact
between the two, for the state administers the program. To deny any relationship between the
two would refuse all religious organizations the receipt of any benefits from social welfare programs. This would amount to nothing less than discrimination against religion and the fostering
of secularism over sectarianism. For a discussion concerning the concept of inclusion of religious
bodies in the receipt of general government benefits, see Giannella, supra note 31, 81 HARV.
L. REv. at 515-28.
155 77 N.J. at 117, 389 A.2d at 958. The majority remarked that such a showing would be an
impermissible interference with public school education. Id. Using needed storage space might
be seen as the school board actively choosing to advance religion over public education, which
may be in violation of the first amendment.
156 Id. at 117, 389 A.2d at 958. The majority, in so categorizing the storage arrangement,
found "[iut certainly [was] not the type of extensive entanglement which was condemned by the
Supreme Court .... ." Id.
157 Id. at 133, 389 A.2d at 966-67 (Clifford, J., dissenting); see note 125 supra and accompanying text.
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ence in the granting process.' 5 8 Additionally, the dissenting members of the court felt that this program would cause widespread community fragmentation concerning the use of the public school facilities
by the various groups. 15 9 Both possibilities seem highly unlikely.
Due to the first-come, first-serve pro forma nature of the application
procedure, 160 it hardly seems profitable for religious institutions to
exert their energies toward a school official who has little control over
the time available to rent a building. Also, the probability that the
community will politically fragmentize is very slight. In fact, considering the historical precedent of allowing religious groups to use public
buildings when without their own religious houses, 161 there appears
to be a far greater threat of divisiveness within the community should
such a program be eliminated.
The majority cautioned, however, that an extended use of the
school buildings by religious groups would be a violation of the establishment clause. 162 However, it refused to articulate any standard
which would define a temporary use of the facilities.1 63 Instead, the
court left that question open-ended to give the trial courts a free
hand in evaluating the standard of a temporary use within the context
of a given factual situation. 164 The court did infer that a rental arrangement which was entering into its sixth year was "approaching
165
the outer bounds" of the meaning of temporary.
158 77 N.J. at 133-34, 389 A.2d at 966-67 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The strength of this
argument was diluted
divisiveness at a level
A.2d at 967 (Clifford,
159 Id. (Clifford, J.,

as Justice Clifford himself questioned whether this situation could be
which would result in the invalidation of the program. Id. at 134, 389
J., dissenting).
dissenting). Again, Justice Clifford recognized that community dissent

alone would not make the rental policy violative of the establishment clause. Id. (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). However, he urged that the court cannot ignore any aspect of political divisiveness
when reviewing the program. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 116-17, 389 A.2d at 958.
161 Id. at 101, 389 A.2d at 950. See also W. CLAYTON, supra note 22, at 771-74. That such
historical precedent should be seriously considered was evidenced by the Walz Court's quotation of Justice Holmes in Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922), ""'[i]f a thing has
been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case tor the
Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."' Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (quoting
Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922)).
162 77 N.J. at 117, 389 A.2d at 958. The court reasoned that at some point the imprimatur of
the school board would be placed upon those religions of excessively long rental periods. Id.
163 Id. at 117-18, 389 A.2d at 958-59. Perhaps the court's reluctance to set a standard
stemmed from an awareness that the equities of each rental situation would be different and
therefore any attempt to manufacture a working guideline would be an exercise in futility.
16 Id. In defining the test, the majority was in general agreement with the Florida supreme
court in Southside Estates that the standard should be two-fold: first, the use must be temporary; and second, there must be a demonstrated intent by the religious group to acquire its own
building. Id.; see Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So. 2d at 700-01.
'
77 N.J. at 118, 389 A.2d at 959.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:524

The court has attempted to set up a flexible standard which will
vary with the facts of each case. 16 6 However, its inferential time
standard may cause some problems when a good-faith religious group,
for one reason or another, cannot erect or purchase a building in that
time. Should a religious body be disallowed from using the building
because it has rented school facilities for a period greater than five or
six years? Perhaps this length of time standard should be used, but
only in conjunction with an intent standard. If a religious group has
taken good-faith steps which evidence an actual intent to acquire a
house of worship, then the time element in a permissible rental stay
should be greater than the time allowed to a group showing no such
intent. As a general guide, the time standard could be set at the
reasonable length of time it would take a religious congregation to
build a suitable place of worship. Again, this requirement would have
to be flexible, bending perhaps to any key facts in a particular rental
situation. While it is somewhat questionable whether or not the
majority in Resnick intended such flexibility, 167 the standard adopted
by the court is broad enough to allow a trial judge to engage in such
an analysis.
The majority in Resnick has taken prior establishment clause case
law analysis and extended slightly the scope of permissible churchstate relationships. The court's opinion re-emphasizes the idea that
religious organizations, as members of society, may partake of the
various benefits afforded by general welfare legislation notwithstanding their religious nature. 168 Due to the pervasive nature of state
regulations and programs, it would be virtually impossible to exclude
religious organizations from those groups eligible to receive state
benefits.1 69 If a state were to deny these religious groups such inci166

Id. at 117-18, 389 A.2d at 958-59.

167 This uncertainty is caused by the majority's outer bounds standard of somewhere in the

five year range, and its discounting of Justice Clifford's argument that the indefiniteness of the
rental program leases was constitutionally invalid. Id. at 117-18 & n.8, 389 A.2d at 958-59.
Possibly the court meant that while requiring the leases to be for a fixed term is highly impractical since the religious groups were without buildings, at the same time it would be impermissible to allow the religious groups to lease the school facilities for an unreasonable period of
time. Id.
568 For other opinions concerning the allowance of religious groups the benefactions
of such
legislation, see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664

(1970). See also Giannella, supra note 31, 81 HARv. L. REv. at 515-28; Current Decisions, supra note
71, at 679--81.
169 Total separation has never been interpreted as being the goal of the establishment clause.
E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). So long as the legislation does not provide
sponsorship or financial support or require active involvement of the sovereign in any religious
activity, the governmental program may be sustainable under the establishment clause. Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971).
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dental benefits, it would be acting in a hostile manner toward religion,1 7 0 which is as prohibited under the first amendment as is a state
17
effectuating the advancement of religion. '
Jeffrey W. Moryan
170 For a general discussion on the right of religious institutions to receive general welfare
benefits, see Giannella, supra note 31, 81 HARV. L. REV. at 515-28; Note, Establishment of
Religion by State Aid, 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 117-21 (1949).
171 Numerous cases have held that government may not hinder nor advance religious groups.
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760-61,
794 (1973); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 312, 315 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1948).

